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1. Introduction
The title of Erik Reinert’s (2007) recent book—How Rich Countries Got Rich . . .
and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor—nicely summarises the twin problems of
what has been called development economics. His answers to the problems
are largely found in what may be called a Listian–Schumpeterian approach to
development economics. In a simplified version of this approach, “develop-
ment” (or “evolution”) has always involved the attempts of fiscal states to im-
prove the position of their national economies in the world economy. The tool
for this improvement is the “increasing returns sector”, i.e., the dynamical part
of the economy consisting of a changing part of manufacturing as well as an
increasing part of services. If a national economy contains such a sector, it can
integrate in the world economy based on the principles of comparative advan-
tage. However, if the sector is weak or does not exist in an economy, the very
same principles lead to a vicious cycle of underdevelopment and poverty.
Reinert does not try to glorify the actions of the fiscal states. The policies
of successful were often, at least in the past, intended to increase the tax base
for hegemonic policies that included expansion by war. However, the national
policies were even more often characterised by a short-termism that created se-
rious financial troubles and very little development. Earlier states with such
states were likely to be conquered by more developed countries, but presently
economic trouble leads to the intervention of the World Bank and the World
Trade Organisation. According to Reinert, theseWashington institutions do not
promote long-term development. Instead, the “Washington Consensus” has
led to a destruction of the weak results of developmental efforts. Reinert (2007,
295) characterised this “a crime against of a considerable percentage of human-
ity” that consists in “the perhaps irreversible deindustrialization—the killing of
the increasing returns sector—of the periphery”. The formula for killing weak
and immature industries that are still based on protection and subsidies is sim-
ple: quick liberalisation. However, the enormous waste of skills and organisa-
tional structures can only be understood on the basis of a historically oriented
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theory that emphasises industrial activity as the key factor needed in the pro-
cess of development.
Reinert suggests that the short-termism and lack of historical sense that
characterises the “Washington Consensus” has been part and parcel of ma-
jor parts of the economics discipline ever since the French physiocrats and
Adam Smith. The lacking recognition of the developmental importance of the
“increasing returns sector” is especially clear in the Ricardo’s theory of inter-
national specialisation and in Samuelson’s (1948; 1949) theory of factor price
equalisation through international trade. The way these theories have been
used for policy advice is an example of what Schumpeter called “the Ricardian
Vice”. This “Vice” is not the application of simplemodels but the application of
inadequate models. Shortly before he died, Schumpeter (1954) argued that the
practice of using inadequate models by his students at Harvard University re-
flected that they “lack the historical sense”. Since they lacked the faculty (sense)
of perceiving history, their models also lacked historical meaning (sense).
In contrast, the leading contributors to the development economics of the
1940s and 1950s had the historical sense. Reinert’s book is designed to resur-
rect this sense by means of polemics against anti-historic approaches and by
positive contributions. The latter includes an attempt to reconstruct “the Other
Canon” that has related to the developmental strategies of fiscal states since
the early start in Renaissance Italy. To reconstruct this “canon”, Reinert moves
back in the history of thought from early development economics via Schum-
peter and List to the Enlightenment and the Renaissance. At the same time,
he collects a series of case stories of “Schumpeterian Mercantilism” that can be
used to promote the historical sense of theorists and policy makers. However,
he does not systematically explore the huge task of developing the often very
loose contributions of “the Other Canon” to a cumulatively developing tool-
box of scientific analysis. The reason is probably that his aim is to promote
the vision that can guide subsequent research. However, it might be relevant
for researchers in the field to ponder on Schumpeter’s account for the scientific
process that is depicted in Figure 1 (adapted from Andersen, 2007).
2. The rise and fall of the historical sense
Schumpeter’s (1989b, 328) apparently naive remedy for most economists’s lack
of historical sense was the production of “a large collection of industrial and
locational monographs” that emphasised innovation and entrepreneurship. If
economists sensed the stylised facts revealed by such “detailed historical case
studies” (p. 325), they would ultimately produce models that were radically
different from those that they actually developed. Here Schumpeter thought of
models of business cycles and growth, but his views also applies to the devel-
opment economics that emerged immediately after World War II.
It was history-related theories that quickly became the trade mark of much
of development economics. Actually, all the producers of what Paul Krug-
man (1994) has called the “high development theory” of the 1940s and 1950s
had the historical sense. The reason is not least that many of them—like Hans
Singer, Albert O. Hirschman, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, GunnarMyrdal, François



















Figure 1: The scientific process according to Schumpeter (1954, Part I; 1989c). The
process includes the competitive scientific endeavours within a commu-
nity of researchers. The competition means that individual contributions
based on fixed ideologies and policies provide analytical tools that are po-
tentially useful for members of the community with different opinions.
Perroux, Paul Streeten, and Alexander Gerschenkron—were brought up with
the long-term economic problems of Continental Europe and often combined
a background in Neoclassical Economics with one in the German Historical
School.
Let us take Singer as example. He had studied at the University of Bonn
with both Schumpeter and the leading historical economist Spiethoff before
studying with Keynes in Cambridge and gained experience as a development
consultant. This mixed background helped Singer (1950) to produce the theory
of the declining terms of trade and factor prices of underdeveloped countries
specialising in standard commodities. The historical consequence is an unequal
distribution of the gains of trade and the—very difficult—solution is to change
the specialisation of poor countries. However, his mixed background as well
as his emphasis on the complexity of the problems of underdevelopment mean
that he cannot be categorised as member of Neoclassical Economics or the His-
torical School or Keynesian Economics or some type of Schumpeterian Eco-
nomics. Thus his work shows surprisingly little direct influence of Schumpeter
and Keynes (Toye, 2006). Furthermore, Singer emphasised the need of tran-
scending even his own views—as did Hirschman (Rodwin and Schön, 1994)
and Myrdal (Steeeten, 1998).
The praiseworthy pluralism—somewould say eclecticism—of the founding
fathers did not promote development economics as a discipline. Their pupils
needed simplification and lacked the historical sense. This meant that the field
of development economics tended to disintegrate because of a lack of a com-
mon core; and this disintegration was promoted by the lack of success stories
from the prime regions of interest (Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa) and
by the shrinkage of the funding of development research.
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Hirschman (1981) wrote an essay on “The Rise and Fall of Development
Economics” with a complex argument. In contrast, Krugman (1994) gave a sim-
ple explanation and suggested the opposite movement: “The Fall and Rise of
Development Economics”. His explanation of the fall is the lack of disciplined
modelling and a new rise presupposes clear foundations of development eco-
nomics by means of formalised reconstructions of some of the results of the
founding fathers. Then it will become clear to which extent the more complex
explanations are needed and to which extent the simpler accounts by textbook
economics are sufficient.
Reinert has an additional explanation for the decline of development eco-
nomics and the conditions for its revival. According to him, the problem
is that the intellectual climate of the Cold War implied that “reality-based
economics—the historical schools of Europe and the institutional school in the
United States—were crowded out and virtually disappeared” (Reinert, 2007,
34); and it was replaced by “the canonical sequence of Smith, Ricardo, Marx,
etc. [that] still constitutes the skeleton for most teaching and scholarly dis-
cussion” (p. 300). The solution is to bring “the Other Canon” of “Reality Eco-
nomics” back to economics (p. 33). Thereby Reinert seems to support Hodg-
son’s (2001) attempt of to bring “history” back to economics, but it should be
emphasised that the predominant static institutionalism is part of the problem
while it is only dynamic and evolutionary institutionalism that might provide
a solution to the crisis of development economics. Furthermore, Krugman’s
remedy should not be forgotten.
3. Schumpeter or List: the choice of a label
The difficulties of development economics are to some extent similar to the
difficulties of innovation systems studies. The literature on national systems of
innovation (Lundvall, 2007) tends to be too systemic, too structuralist, and too
institutionalist. Although this tendency might have been necessary to get such
studies started, there is a serious need of adding a more historical approach
emphasising the creation and recreation of national systems of innovation.
Schumpeterian: One strategy for reaching this historical activism is to perform
the difficult intellectual task of combining theories of entrepreneur-driven
development with the more or less systemic theories (Radosevic, 2007).
This strategy might be called Schumpeterian, a label that covers much
more than Joseph Schumpeter (1934).
Listian: An apparently different strategy is to study the creation and recreation
of innovation systems as reflecting state actions for national development.
This strategy is followed by Reinert (2007) and Chang (2007b; 2007a). Al-
though such authors might be characterised as techno-mercantilists or
techno-protectionists, these policy-oriented labels bring more heat than
light since the approach is not tightly bound to any particular policy. It is
more fruitful to characterise the approach as Listian, although Reinert’s
notion of the “Other Canon” emphasised that the label is not constrained
to Friedrich List (1885).
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Listian–Schumpeterian: However, the Listian label is not really sufficient to
cover the efforts of Reinert and Chang since the inspiration from the tra-
dition to which List belongs has also led to studies characterised by static
institutionalism. Therefore, their approach that tries to capture the history
of, and present possibilities for, the creation of dynamic industrial capa-
bilities by relatively weak states might better be characterised as Listian–
Schumpeterian Development Economics.
Schumpeterian as covering Listian: When considering the scale and scope of
both Schumpeter’s work and the subsequent neo-Schumpeterian, or post-
Schumpeterian, literature, it might even be possible to simply talk about
their contributions as promoting a jump forward of Schumpeterian De-
velopment Economics.
4. Bringing Schumpeter to development economics
At the meeting of the American Economic Association that took place a few
days before Schumpeter’s death early in 1950, he discussed development eco-
nomics with Hans Singer (1989). Schumpeter had earlier told his former stu-
dent that the problems of underdevelopment were purely political and not the
topic of economic theory. However, now that he saw Singer’s (1950) prelimi-
nary results, he wished him luck with the endeavour. Nevertheless, the early
Singer did not think it possible to apply Schumpeter’s (1934) Theory of Economic
Development. Instead, Singer (1953, 19–20) used this book to define develop-
ment economics both negatively and positively (relating to the 1952 version of
Wallich, 1958):
1. Singer emphasises that while the agents of economic development
in Schumpeter’s theory are innovating and pioneering private en-
trepreneurs, government is the most likely agency of economic develop-
ment in many underdeveloped countries.
2. While Schumpeter assumes changes in production functions due to new
products or processes, Singer emphasises that economic development
through the introduction and adaptation of products and methods.
3. The generating force of Schumpeter’s economic development is found in
the supply side of the market while Singer’s generating force in the desire
for increased consumption.
Singer’s ways of formulating the difference between Schumpeterian theory
and the problems of development economics were unfortunate because they ig-
nored the necessary mix between private and governmental entrepreneurship,
the innovation characteristics of the much of the introduction of technologies
from abroad, and the need of a relative independence of the supply side in or-
der to serve the ultimate goal of increased consumption. The linkage theory
of Hirschman (1958) was also made ineffective by translating it from its orig-
inal Schumpeter-like perspective of facilitating interdependent entrepreneur-
ship to a matter of maximising linkages in the sense of input–output tables of
























Figure 2: Schumpeter’s evolutionary pivot as well as the main sources and compo-
nents of his analytical work.
developed countries. Such shifts away from a Schumpeterian world created an
enormous confusion in the development economics community (1975).
On this background, one of the recipes for a resurrection of develop-
ment economics seems to be an increased—and carefully thought out—dose
of Schumpeterian perspectives. This also seems to have been the conclusion of
later Singer, who about Schumpeter’s book stated stated that “I realise now
more clearly than in earlier years how deeply relevant many of its [TED’s]
themes are to the development of poor countries and the problems of under-
developed countries.” He especially pointed at three themes that had origi-
nally been de-emphasised but that “now seem to me the key to the problems of
development in poor countries” (Singer, 1997, 131):
1. Schumpeter brought out “the great importance of technology, innovation,
access to innovation and ability and the means of linking innovation with
the production process in the form of new products or new processes or
the development of new markets.”
2. In Schumpeter, the “emphasis placed on the fact that development repre-
sents a disruption of familiar and traditional processes of stationary cir-
culation, arousing resistances and hurting established interests.”
3. Schumpeter tried to depict the self-transformation of the economic sys-
tem by entrepreneurial initiative and Singer relates this to notions of “self-
reliance, self-sustaining growth, dependency, backwash effects and all
that!”
The great thing about Reinert’s (2007) contribution is that it serves to bring
attention to these three Schumpeterian themes of development economics
while at the same time keeping his emphasis on the state and its promotion
of a wealth-creating sector characterised by increasing returns. The similarity
between the approaches of Reinert and Schumpeter is obvious from Figure 2
(adapted from Andersen, 2007).
Although Reinert emphasises the inspiration from the Historical School and
other types of history-friendly social science, he acknowledges the Marxian
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Challenge. Furthermore, he puts much emphasis on what is presently called
Elite Theory to promote an activist and creative image of human behaviour
while at the same time including the role of routine behaviour and vested in-
terests.
However, Reinert seems to have replaced Neoclassical Economics by In-
dustrial Policy. As we shall see in the next section, policy issues have a place
in the Schumpeterian account for the scientific process. With respect to Neo-
classical Economics, the difference is largely a matter of style. Actually, Schum-
peter (1942, Part II) used the same style in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.
However, I guess that he in more scholarly works would, for instance, have
praised the factor price equalisation theorem of his student and friend Paul
Samuelson—and then use it as limiting case that beautifully serves as the start-
ing point for summarising main mechanisms the often radically different reali-
ties.
Schumpeter’s design of his theory of capitalist economic evolution might
to some extent be seen as following Krugman’s (1994) recipe for overcoming
“the fall of development economics”. He tried to overcome the weaknesses of
the Historical School by developing a relatively simple model by means of the
formal tools available for him. These were not least the tools provided by Léon
Walras and the rest of Neoclassical Economics (Figure 2). However, he reinter-
preted these tools in the light of the stylised vision of economic history wanted
to implement, a vision that to some extent was based on the facts collected by
the Historical School. For instance, he did not apply Reinert’s strategy of re-
jecting equilibrium analysis. Instead, he reinterpreted general economic equi-
librium as reflecting a lock-in to a certain stage of growth and development. It
is in this setting that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur enters the model.
The interests of ordinary economic agents are in many ways locked to the
existing circular flow of economic life while the profit expectations of the en-
trepreneur is connected to the troublesome period of transformation of the
circular flow. When the basic resistance has been overcome by the pioneer-
ing entrepreneur, the bandwagon of imitators and bankers turn to expectation-
based behaviour, and finally ordinary economic agents are forced to follow the
lead. This process leads to a picture of economic evolution, or economic de-
velopment, as taking the form of innovative revolutions punctuated by quasi-
equilibrium episodes.
This story presupposes a heterogeneity of economic agents that has been ab-
stracted away by both Classical Economics and Neoclassical Economics. There-
fore, it was crucial for Schumpeter to apply to his evolutionary economics the
elusive Elite Theory that ranges from Nietzsche to Sombart and Pareto. Here
he found a dichotomy between routine behaviour and creative behaviour as
well as ideas of human motivation that explained extraordinary effort of an
apparently risk-seeking type.
Schumpeter also used Elite Theory as a way of breeding life intoMarxian vi-
sion of the self-transformation of economic and social life—a vision whose im-
plementation had largely been strangled by Marx’s dependence on the tools of
Ricardian Economics. Although it can be argued that the Schumpeterian vision
was similarly strangled by its dependence of the tools of Walrasian Economics,
his dependence on Elite Theory helps us to recognise clearly his attempts to
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change the available analytical tools.
5. Reinert and Schumpeter on the history of economics
After the English manufacturing industry had emerged as the world leader,
the English state could largely drop the protectionism that had promoted this
position and enjoy the benefits of free trade as well as the theories that sup-
ported it. In contrast, laggards like Germany and the USA developed the in-
dustrial policies of the mercantilist tradition; and some of their economists, like
List (1885), refined the related theories like the “infant industry argument” for
“educational” protectionism in relation to manufacturing industry and made
polemics against British Classical Economics.
However, Reinert demonstrates convincingly that that this type of thinking
had deep roots and that it existed long enough to influence the emergence of de-
velopment economics in the 1940s and 1950s. An early peak performance was
provided by the Italian economist Antonio Serra, that in some respects is clearer
than later contributions by, e.g., List and Myrdal. Actually, Serra presented in
the early seventeenth century a pioneering account for systemic economic un-
derdevelopment and development based on the dismal economic performance
of his native Naples and the success story of Venice (Reinert, 1999, 291–294).
There are many more contributions to “the Other Canon”, and Reinert
(2007, 10) has bought most of them for his extensive research library as they
have become available—partly by the selling-out from the unique Baker Li-
brary of Harvard University that he explored while studying at Harvard Busi-
ness School. Thereby, he may be said to have made the same type of study that
Schumpeter had performed in the Baker Library when producing his monu-
mental History of Economic Analysis. There is, however, a major difference be-
tween Schumpeter’s and Reinert’s study of the history of economics.
Reinert (2007, 4) is trained in the case study method that is intensively ap-
plied at Harvard Business School (and explicitly introduced as a way of exploit-
ing the methodology of the German Historical School). He seems interested in
providing a collection of case studies of mercantilist policy and the related the-
orising ranging from Italian Renaissance to the Bismarckian policies of the late
nineteenth century.
In contrast, Schumpeter’sHistory focussed on the analytical progress of the-
oretical economics and only used policy debates to provide information on
the background for theoretical work. Although he is one of the few leading
economists who took mercantilism seriously and considered it a major contrib-
utor to the emergence of the science of economics (together with a broadly con-
ceived scholasticism), he did not make a dichotomy similar to Reinert’s “stan-
dard economics” and “reality economics”.
Instead Schumpeter distinguished between (1) the economics serving the
study of the functioning and administration of a largely given economic system
and (2) the economics that focussed on the mechanisms of irreversible trans-
formation of economic systems. While the former activity had to some extent
developed into a science that cumulatively improves theoretical tools, the lat-
ter has hardly showed any analytical progress since Antonio Serra and simi-
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lar early contributors from the European Continent (which Schumpeter praises
highly). Since he produced a history of the cumulative improvement of tools of
economic analysis, he has surprisingly little to tell about later developments of
“the Other Canon” of transformation economics.
Schumpeter’s readers should not consider the gradual disappearance of
“the Other Canon” from the exposition of History as based on a value judge-
ment. He obviously considered the problems of transformation—or develop-
ment or evolution—as by far the most important ones, and he emphasised the
very limited range of the results of Neoclassical Economics. However, what
had basically been obtained by Gustav von Schmoller and his followers in the
Historical School was also rather pedestrian from the viewpoint of a born the-
orist: the hugely increased quantity and quality of economically and politically
relevant data. What had not been obtained—even by Sombart, Spiethoff, and
Max Weber—was cumulatively improvable theoretical tools.
Werner Sombart (1902) tried to combine Marx’s evolutionary “logic” with
historical fact in the two large volumes on Modern Capitalism, of which the lat-
ter volume was called Theorie der kapitalistischen Entwicklung. Sombart’s book
presented an idiosyncratic mix of theoretical sketches and historical facts that,
according to Schumpeter (1954, 816–817n), “even out-Schmollered Schmoller”.
Although this book “shocked professional historians by its often unsubstantial
brilliance . . . it was in a sense a peak achievement of the historical school, and
highly stimulating even in its errors”.
Sombart’s idiosyncratic book seems to have provided one of the challenges
for the early Schumpeter (1912): he wanted to create a systematic theory of
capitalist economic evolution, a theory that was intended to be cumulatively
improvable (and to some extent extensible to evolutionary sociology and evo-
lutionary political science). Although these goals have only recently been ful-
filled and only in a partial way (see, e.g., Hanusch and Pyka, 2007), Schumpeter
spent a lifetime on the project andmuch interestingmaterial—even on “Schum-
peterian Mercantilism”—can be found scattered in his works.
6. Reinert’s “Schumpeterian Mercantilism”
Reinert’s starting point for entering development economics is to a large extent
the study of the history of industrially oriented trade policy and the related
trade theory. This study has an emphasis on the theory of practice of what has
been called “mercantilism”. Ever since Adam Smith, mercantilism has been
ridiculed by most leading economists as the alchemy of the balance of pay-
ments. However, Reinert follows the lead of Schumpeter by trying to rescue
the insights of the economists of the mercantilist traditions and reducing Smith
to the role a somewhat dubious system-builder.
This is partly done by demonstrating that “[p]romoting new knowledge
was a fundamental driving force for the economic policies of the Renaissance—
and later of all realökonomischmercantilism, cameralism and Colbertism” (Rein-
ert, 1999, 276). He characterises this aspect of the state’s promotion of economic
growth as “Schumpeterian” mercantilism. It is obvious that this “dynamic and
knowledge-producing rent-seeking—or Schumpeterian Mercantilism—had in
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many cases degenerated into static rent-seeking. (p. 301). However, it seems
clear that the mercantilist tradition—from the Italian city states of the Renais-
sance and onwards—focussed on the causes of the relative economic strength
of the European states. The key cause for the increase in knowledge, skills and
competitiveness was the creation of a strong and developing manufacturing
sector.
According to most mercantilists, the manufacturing sector was not only
supposed to create exports and substitute imports. It also served as an engine of
growth through its internal development and its influence on the productivity
of the sectors of agriculture and transport: “For centuries manufacturing was
synonymous with the combination of technological change, increasing returns
and imperfect competition” (Reinert, 2007, 6). Furthermore, the direct military
relevance of parts of the manufacturing sector was obvious to everyone and the
indirect consequence of underdevelopment was normally submission under a
more developed country.
Reinert (p. 77) emphasises one of the consequences of submission:
“Colonies were regions where . . . synergetic interaction was not intended to
take place . . . The prohibition of manufacturing industries—whether explicit
or de facto—is the key element in any colonial and neo-colonial policy.” Since
Ricardo’s theory of international specialisation told that manufacturing does
not matter, it served to make this policy morally defensible. However, it was
definitely not used if it prescribed England to deindustrialise in important ar-
eas.
A major task for Reinert is to collect the tools that promote the analysis
of the described phenomena. With respect to the elements of this toolbox he
to some extent agrees with, for instance, John Mathews (2005), whose list of
classics includes the economic historian Gerschenkron (latecomer industrial
dynamics), the political economist Akamatsu (the flying geese patterns of in-
dustry transfer from country to country), and not least Hirschman and other
development economists (increasing returns, forward and backward linkages,
etc.). However, although Reinert obviously likes a mixed analytical toolbox, he
also wants to create some coherence. Here Schumpeter’s work and the post-
Schumpeterian literature are major sources of inspiration.
7. Towards a Schumpeterian analysis of “mercantilism”
If Schumpeter had been confronted with the label “Schumpeterian Mercantil-
ism” and if he had been able to overcome his rejection of both terms as being
imprecise, then he might have said that “[w]e are [here] dealing with a partic-
ular range of problems and our schema [Schumpeter’s basic model] has been
devised to serve it” (Schumpeter, 1939, 235). In the Schumpeterian model of
economic evolution, the state can either act as entrepreneur or as provider of
some of the parameters [“data”] for entrepreneurial action. Thus he does not
need to a separate category of “statecraft—mercantilist or other”. It is already
included, but it is included at a highly abstract level.
A more concrete analysis might be developed by taking the starting point
in Schumpeter’s (Schumpeter (1991a)) “The Crisis of the Tax State” and other
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of his papers on economic sociology (like Schumpeter, Schumpeter (1991c)).
However, such an effort is definitely not a simple one. Schumpeter’s sociologi-
cal papers were written for the occasion and we need to reconstruct their basic
logic. For instance, the tax state is described as “parasitic” and it only gradu-
ally becomes understandable why the relationship between the state and the
economy also be a symbiotic one of the type described by Reinert. Here we are,
however, helped by scattered and historically oriented remarks.
Schumpeter (1939, 234) criticism of the concept of mercantilism is sum-
marised in the following remark: “we have constructed a historical entity called
Mercantilism and endowed it with a set of consistent principles”, but this his-
torical entity does not “embody any set of definite economic aims or princi-
ples.” Although no unified mercantilist set of policies existed, it is clear that,
especially in Germany, “the prince and his bureaucracy became for centuries
the dominant factor in economic life” (Schumpeter, 1939, 234).
In the German situation, it can be said that it was “the state rather then
the entrepreneur which initiated modern industry” (p. 235). Apart from the
many cases in which the state “directly filled the entrepreneurial function, . . .
it conditioned enterprise by reshaping the institutional framework . . . and by
fostering it in various ways, some of which in fact comewithin what we usually
understand by mercantilist policy.”
In France, Colbertism meant that the “bourgeoisie was scientifically ex-
ploited and protected—like game in a well-ordered park—in such a way as
to . . . serve the splendor of the prince, the court, and the army”. Since “a max-
imum of surplus [was] being sucked up to finance the great center of expendi-
ture” (p. 235), the “scientific” promotion of exploitable manufacturing capabil-
ities was subject to strong limitations.
However, the state functioned differently during the last of Schumpe-
ter’s Kondratieff waves—“The Neo-Mercantilist Kondratieff”—which he dates
from 1897. Here we see the problematic nature of the aggressive, colonising,
and war-preparing “Neo-Mercantilism” of the European states of his youth
(Schumpeter, 1991c, 199–208). However, we also find the less aggressive strat-
egy for industrial development of the relatively underdeveloped Austrian-
Hungarian Empire, which was designed by the Koerber government in the
beginning of the twentieth century. I have found no evidence that Schumpe-
ter followed his teacher Böhm-Bawerk, who had been a member of the Koerber
government, in rejecting this strategy that was never fully implemented (Ger-
schenkron, 1977).
Schumpeter would probably largely have classified the relatively concrete
treatment of mercantilist statecraft as “economic sociology”. However, al-
though he made significant contributions to this field (Schumpeter, 1991b), he
never treated the problems of underdevelopment and state-promoted indus-
trial evolution systematically. Presently, Reinert’s (2007) book seems to be the
closest approximation to what Schumpeter might have written as a follow-up
of Antonio Serra’s analysis—of we ignore much of the book’s policy-oriented
polemics and put its scientific polemics in a more guarded format.
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